Grenada Real Estate: The Real Problems

Foreword

I wrote this book the way most useful things get written — not as a plan, but as a reaction to the same conversation happening over and over.

I buy and invest in property in Grenada. Over the years I've sat across from sellers who'd had a listing up for three years with no offers, heirs trying to agree on a price for a home none of them can bear to talk about, and Citizenship by Investment unit owners who assumed their condo was worth exactly what they paid for it, passport included. Almost none of these situations were unique. They were the same handful of structural problems, showing up again and again, in different circumstances.

Grenada doesn't have a licensing regime for real estate agents. It doesn't have a multiple listing service, or any shared record of what property actually sells for. Almost nothing is sold on an exclusive basis, so almost nothing is properly marketed. And on top of all of that, the people best positioned to understand what a seller actually needs — their agents — are rarely the ones asking.

None of this is a scandal. Nobody set out to build a market that works this way. It's what happens, gradually, when the infrastructure other markets take for granted was simply never put in place, and everyone adapted around the gap instead of closing it.

This book doesn't argue that Grenada is a bad place to buy or sell property. I wouldn't be doing this work if I believed that. It argues that the market has a specific, nameable set of problems, that those problems compound each other in predictable ways, and that most of them are fixable — by policy, by practice, or simply by someone deciding to ask a seller a better question than "what's your price."

The book is organized in three parts. The first covers the structural gaps in the market itself — licensing, pricing data, listing practices, transaction costs, and financing. The second turns to something more human: the real reasons people sell, and how rarely anyone bothers to find out what those reasons actually are. The third looks closely at one specific and growing corner of the market, Grenada's CBI-linked developments, where several of these problems collide at once.

If you're buying, selling, or simply trying to understand this market, my hope is that this gives you a clearer picture than the listing sheets do.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: No Licence, No Floor: Why Anyone Can Call Themselves an Agent in Grenada

There is no licensing requirement to sell real estate in Grenada. No exam, no registration, no code of conduct, no professional body you can complain to when something goes wrong. Anyone can put up a sign, build a website, and call themselves an agent.

That sounds like a minor administrative gap. It isn't. Licensing exists in most property markets for a specific reason: it sets a floor of competence and accountability that everyone in the transaction can rely on, whether they know the agent personally or not.

What licensing actually does

In a licensed market, an agent has demonstrated a baseline understanding of contracts, disclosure obligations, deposit handling, and fair dealing before they're allowed to represent anyone. If they fall short of that standard, there's a regulator to answer to and, in serious cases, a licence to lose. That threat of consequence is what keeps behaviour in line even when nobody's watching closely.

None of that exists here. An "agent" in Grenada might be genuinely experienced and careful. They might also be someone who decided last month that real estate looked like a good way to earn a commission. From the outside, a buyer or seller has almost no way to tell the difference before money is on the table.

The knock-on effect nobody mentions: no continuing education

Licensing regimes elsewhere typically require ongoing education — new contract law, new disclosure rules, new ethical standards, refreshed periodically. That requirement doesn't exist in isolation; it exists because a licence created the reason for it.

Take away the licence and you take away the reason. Nobody here is required to learn how to price a property against real data, how to structure a deposit safely, how to disclose a known defect, or how to put together anything more sophisticated than "buyer pays, seller signs." Whatever an agent knows, they picked up informally, if they picked it up at all.

Wide variance, no way to spot it

The predictable result is a huge range in practice quality, all operating under the same title. Some agents here are genuinely skilled, careful, and worth trusting with a six-figure transaction. Others are improvising in real time on someone else's largest asset. Both call themselves agents. Both advertise the same way. Neither carries any external signal of which one you're dealing with.

A buyer or seller has to do their own vetting from scratch, every time, with none of the shortcuts — verified credentials, a complaints record, a professional standard to point to — that licensing normally provides.

Why this matters beyond any one transaction

This isn't just a risk to individual buyers and sellers. It's the root of several other problems in this market that later posts in this series dig into: pricing that has no defensible basis, listings marketed with no real strategy, and agents who never learn to ask a seller what they actually need from a sale. All of it traces back to the same starting point — nobody had to earn the right to do this work, so nobody was taught how to do it well.

Fixing it doesn’t require reinventing anything. Licensing regimes exist all over the region as working templates. The absence here isn’t a mystery to solve; it’s a policy choice that hasn’t been made yet.

Chapter 2: No MLS, No Comparables: Why Grenada Property Prices Are Basically Guesses

Ask how a home is priced in most markets and the answer is comparable sales: what similar properties nearby actually sold for recently, adjusted for size, condition, and location. It's not perfect, but it's grounded in real transactions.

Ask the same question in Grenada and there's often no real answer at all. Grenada has no multiple listing service — no shared database of what's for sale, what's sold, when, or for how much. Without that, comparable sales analysis simply can't happen the way it does elsewhere.

Where the price actually comes from

With no sold data to check against, pricing collapses to a single input: what the seller feels the property is worth. That number might be grounded in something real — what they paid, what they've invested, genuine local knowledge. It might also be entirely aspirational, based on what they'd like to walk away with rather than what the market would actually support.

Either way, the agent taking the listing has little basis to push back. Arguing the price down risks losing the listing to the next agent who'll take it at whatever number the seller wants. So the number goes up on the website unchallenged.

The square-footage problem

In markets with real data, price per square foot is the first sanity check anyone runs — a quick way to see if an asking price is in the right neighborhood before digging deeper. In Grenada, that number is barely part of the conversation, because there's no reliable dataset to calculate it against. You'll see two comparable homes in the same area listed hundreds of thousands apart, with neither price obviously wrong, because there's no shared benchmark to measure either one against.

What this does to buyers

A buyer here can't do the thing buyers normally do first: check the ask against recent sales. They're left triangulating from asking prices alone, which are exactly the numbers most in need of scrutiny. Overpriced listings and fairly priced listings sit side by side, indistinguishable without real digging — appraisals, direct comparisons pieced together manually, or local knowledge built up over years.

What this does to sellers

It cuts both ways. A seller with a fairly priced, well-positioned property has no way to demonstrate that to a skeptical buyer. Every seller's number looks equally unsupported, because none of them are supported by anything but the seller's own opinion. Fair pricing and wishful pricing get treated the same by a market that has no way to tell them apart.

Why this is fixable

An MLS isn't a mystery to build. It's a shared database and an agreement among agencies to populate it honestly. Recorded property transfers already sit with the

Registry — turning that into a usable, even partial, sold-price reference is a solvable problem, not a technological one. The barrier isn’t capability. It’s that no group of agencies has yet found it worth their while to cooperate on it, in a market where cooperation isn’t the norm to begin with — which is exactly the subject of the next post in this series.

Chapter 3: The Open-Listing Trap: Why Six Agents on One Property Means Zero Marketing

Ask around and you'll find the same property listed by four, five, sometimes six different agents at once, often at slightly different prices. This is normal in Grenada. Exclusive agency agreements — where one agent formally represents a seller for a defined period — are rare. Most sellers just hand the listing to whoever asks, with no written terms at all.

The logic that doesn't hold up

The reasoning seems sound on the surface: more agents advertising means more exposure, which means a faster sale. It's the opposite of how it actually plays out.

When six agents share one listing and only one of them will ever get paid, none of them has a reason to invest real effort. Commissioning professional photography costs money with no guarantee of return. Building an actual marketing plan takes time that might benefit a competitor instead. Even giving the seller honest, possibly unwelcome feedback about their price is effort spent on a relationship that isn't secured — why deliver a hard truth to a client who might sell through someone else next week?

So mostly, nobody does any of it. The property gets posted to a website and left there.

Why every site looks the same

This is also why browsing Grenada property listings feels repetitive fast. Every agency's website carries the same handful of properties, copied or scraped from each other, frequently with outdated prices and no clear signal of whether the property is even still available. A buyer scrolling through what looks like a large inventory is often looking at the same fifty or so listings recycled across a dozen sites.

No one is accountable

In an exclusive arrangement, one agent owns the outcome. If the property doesn't sell, that's their problem to solve — adjust the marketing, revisit the price, bring in more showings. In an open listing, no single person owns that outcome. If it doesn't sell, that's just how it goes; nobody's specifically failing, because nobody was specifically responsible.

Sellers lose the most from this. They mistake the number of agents advertising their home for the level of effort being spent on it. Usually it's the reverse: the more hands on a listing, the less any one of them is doing.

What actually drives this behaviour

Rational actors respond to incentives, and the incentive structure here rewards doing the least. An exclusive agreement changes that calculus completely — it gives one agent a real stake in the outcome, which is the only thing that reliably produces real marketing effort, honest pricing conversations, and a seller relationship worth investing in.

That kind of relationship is also the one place where an agent might actually get around to asking a seller the question that matters most in any sale — which is the subject the next cluster of this series takes on.

Chapter 4: Why Grenada Listings Sit for Years (And What That Does to Buyers)

Overpriced. Handled by six uninvested agents. No comparable sales to correct against. Put those three things together — covered in the first three posts of this series — and the result is predictable: a property listed above what the market will bear doesn't get corrected. It just sits.

No data, no proof, but a clear pattern

Grenada doesn't track or publish days-on-market figures, so there's no official statistic to cite here. But from personal observation, and from people I know personally who have had properties listed for years without a sale, it isn't an exaggeration to say a meaningful share of listings on this island simply don't move. Ask around and most people involved in property here can name at least one listing that's been up for three, four, five years.

Why stale inventory poisons the whole market

A property that sits for years doesn't just fail on its own terms. It changes how buyers treat every other listing they see.

Once a buyer learns that asking prices here are frequently disconnected from what a property will actually sell for, they stop trusting any asking price at face value. Every offer starts from a position of skepticism and gets negotiated down hard, regardless of whether the specific listing in front of them is realistically priced or not. Sellers who priced fairly from the start get pulled into the same discount conversation as sellers who never adjusted a wildly optimistic number.

Illiquidity discourages the buyers who'd fix it

A liquid market — one where properties sell in a reasonable window at fair prices — attracts investment buyers, because they can model an exit. An illiquid one does the opposite. Buyers who might otherwise bring capital and demand into the market can see, just by browsing listings, how long things sit here. That's a deterrent before a single offer is ever made.

The compounding effect

This is the piece that makes the problem self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting. In a healthy market, an overpriced listing eventually adjusts — the seller lowers it, or a persuasive comparable sale forces the issue. Here, there's no comparable data to force anything, no agent invested enough to push for an adjustment, and no market pressure strong enough to correct the number. So the listing just stays where it is, sometimes for years, adding to the pile of stale inventory that teaches the next buyer not to trust asking prices either.

None of this is unique to any one seller's stubbornness. It's what happens when every mechanism a healthy market uses to self-correct — data, representation, accountability — is missing at once.

Chapter 5: Well Beyond 20%: What Buying and Selling Actually Costs

Of everything covered so far in this series, this is the one that does the most quiet damage, because it isn't really about market dysfunction. It's arithmetic, and arithmetic doesn't care how badly someone needs to sell.

What it actually costs to buy and sell here

Between government transfer taxes, legal fees, the alien landholding licence for non-nationals, agent commission, and the assorted closing costs on both ends of a deal, total transaction expenses on a Grenada purchase and eventual resale can run well beyond 20% of the purchase price for a non-national buyer and seller — sometimes considerably beyond it — depending on nationality, financing, and how the deal is structured. Rates differ for nationals and non-nationals, so anyone making a real decision on this should confirm current figures with an attorney rather than take a number from a blog post.

Who actually pays what

One thing worth correcting up front: commission is a seller-side cost. The buyer doesn't pay it, and by law, neither does the buyer pay the seller's property transfer tax — Grenada law expressly prohibits shifting that particular tax onto the buyer. The two sides of a transaction owe genuinely different things, so it's worth laying them out separately rather than as one blended list.

Buyer's costs

Cost	Rate	Who it applies to
Alien Landholding Licence	10% of purchase price	Non-nationals only
Stamp duty	~1% of purchase price	All buyers
Legal fees	1–3% of purchase price, + 15% VAT	All buyers

A national or OECS buyer skips the Alien Landholding Licence entirely — it applies only to non-nationals — leaving them with just stamp duty and legal fees.

A note on sourcing: Grenada's Property Transfer Tax Act, on paper, also lists a separate 10% charge on non-national purchasers. In practice, established Grenada real estate agencies advising actual buyers only cite the Alien Landholding Licence as the purchaser-side cost, with no separate purchaser transfer tax mentioned. The table above reflects what buyers are actually charged in practice; anyone relying on this for a real transaction should still confirm directly with a Grenada attorney, since a gap between statute and practice is possible.

Seller's costs

Cost	Rate	Who it applies to
Property Transfer Tax (vendor's share)	5% of market value (nationals / OECS) or 15% (non-nationals); first EC$20,000 exempt	All sellers, rate depends on nationality
Real estate commission	5% + 15% VAT on the commission (≈5.75% effective)	All sellers

Legal fees	1–3% of purchase price, + 15% VAT	All sellers

The vendor’s transfer tax is the one that, by law, can never be shifted onto the buyer — it’s the seller’s obligation outright, regardless of how the deal is negotiated.

What the full round trip actually costs

Add it up and the gap by nationality is still substantial, even correcting for the purchaser-side transfer tax question above. For a non-national buying, buyer-side costs — the Alien Landholding Licence, stamp duty, and legal fees — typically land somewhere around 12–14% of the purchase price, paid before the buyer owns anything. A national or OECS buyer skips the Alien Landholding Licence entirely, leaving just stamp duty and legal fees, a few percent at most. On the eventual resale, seller-side costs — the vendor’s transfer tax, commission, and legal fees — typically run 11–21%, depending on nationality and how the deal is priced and negotiated. Combined, a full non-national buy-and-resell cycle still comfortably clears 20% of the property’s value in pure transaction friction, and can run well beyond that depending on the seller’s eventual transfer tax rate.

That gap isn’t a rounding difference. It’s the difference between a market that’s merely expensive to transact in and one that’s structurally hostile to the exact buyers — foreign investors and CBI participants — it most depends on to bring outside capital in.

What that means for an ordinary owner

Picture someone who bought a property, held it for a few years, and is now ready to sell. To simply break even — not profit, just recover what they put in — the property has to have appreciated enough to absorb the cost of the original purchase and the cost of the coming sale combined. If the market hasn’t moved that much, there’s no way to sell at “market value” and walk away whole.

So sellers don’t price at market value. They price at what they need to cover their own costs and, ideally, come away with something for the trouble. That’s not greed. It’s a reasonable response to a cost structure that punishes anyone who sells without a large enough gain already baked in.

Why this compounds everything else in this series

This interacts directly with the problems already covered. A seller pricing for their own breakeven, in a market with no comparable sales data to check that number against, and no agent with a real stake in pushing back on it, ends up with a listing priced well above what a buyer would otherwise pay for it. That listing then sits, because nothing in this market corrects an unrealistic price. And a property that sits longer costs its owner more in holding expenses, which raises the number they need to recover even further the next time they try.

High friction costs push prices up. Inflated prices slow sales. Slow sales make ownership more expensive. More expensive ownership justifies wanting a bigger margin on exit. It’s a loop, and it starts here.

A note on new CBI-linked developments

This same dynamic shows up in an amplified form in newer, high-end developments tied to Grenada’s Citizenship by Investment programme, where the reference prices being set are driven by policy minimums rather than by transaction cost economics at all. That’s significant enough to deserve its own cluster later in this series.

What would actually help

Reviewing transaction costs is fundamentally a policy conversation — legal fees, transfer tax rates, licensing fees for non-nationals are all set by rules that could be revisited. It’s worth having that conversation, because a cost structure this heavy functions as a direct tax on market liquidity: fewer sales happen, the ones that do happen take longer, and prices stay disconnected from real value throughout.

Chapter 6: Cash Only: Why Creative Financing Barely Exists in Grenada Real Estate

Almost every property transaction in Grenada closes in cash. Local mortgage lending is limited and slow to move. Foreign buyers frequently aren't financing through local institutions at all — they're wiring the full amount and closing outright.

The tools that are missing

In markets with more developed financing infrastructure, buyers and sellers have a whole toolkit for bridging the gap between what a buyer can pay today and what a seller needs eventually: vendor financing, where the seller effectively becomes the lender over time; lease-to-own arrangements; staged payment structures tied to milestones; options to purchase; joint ventures between a landowner and a builder who develops the site; assignable contracts that let a buyer bring in financing partners later.

None of these require sophisticated infrastructure to exist. They require sellers and agents who know how to structure them, and enough legal and enforcement confidence that both sides trust the structure will hold up. In Grenada, both of those are in short supply.

Why the tools aren't being used

Part of it traces straight back to the first post in this series: with no licensing and no continuing education, nobody's been trained in how to build these structures, so the default is the simplest possible transaction — full cash, full stop. Part of it is that the legal and enforcement comfort around more creative arrangements is genuinely thinner here than in markets with a longer track record of using them, which makes both sides more cautious about relying on anything more complex than a straight sale.

What this does to the buyer pool

The practical effect is that the pool of potential buyers for any given property shrinks to people who can write a full check, on an island where that's a comparatively small group. Buyers who could service a property over time, but don't have the full amount sitting liquid today, are effectively locked out — not because they're not creditworthy in any real sense, but because nobody's offering a structure that would let them in.

For sellers, that's a real cost. A smaller buyer pool means fewer offers, more time on market, and less negotiating leverage — all of which layers directly onto the stale-inventory problem covered earlier in this series.

Where the opportunity sits

This is one of the more fixable pieces of the puzzle, because it doesn't require policy change or new institutions — it requires individual sellers and buyers willing to structure a deal creatively, and someone on one side of the table who actually knows how. A seller who's genuinely motivated — covered in the next cluster of this series — is often the person most open to exactly this kind of structure, because it can solve their real problem (steady income, a clean exit, avoiding a long vacancy) in a way a single cash offer sometimes can't.

That wraps the market-structure cluster of this series. The next set of posts turns to a different kind of gap — not in the market's infrastructure, but in the conversations agents have, or don't have, with the sellers they represent.

Chapter 7: The Question Agents Never Ask: Why Are You Really Selling?

Every listing in Grenada has a headline: bedrooms, bathrooms, square footage, view, price. What it almost never has is the one piece of information that actually determines how a deal should be structured — why the seller is selling in the first place.

I’ve sat across from sellers, sometimes after an agent has already held the listing for a year, and asked one plain question: why do you actually want to sell? More often than not, nobody had asked them that before. Not the agent who took the listing. Not the agent who’s been advertising it since.

Why the listing sheet hides more than it reveals

A price and a description tell you what a seller is asking. They tell you nothing about what a seller actually needs, and those are very different things.

A seller who needs cash in sixty days because of a bill has a completely different negotiation than a seller who’s emotionally unready to let go of a family home but says yes to every offer that comes in, hoping it’ll fall through. A seller who’s already relocated and is paying two sets of expenses a month has a different pressure than one managing an estate for siblings who don’t agree with each other. Same asking price on paper. Completely different deal underneath it.

Without knowing which situation you’re in, every offer is a guess. With it, an offer can be built to solve the actual problem — and sellers say yes to solutions, not just to numbers.

Why the question doesn’t get asked

It isn’t that agents here don’t care. It’s some mix of three things.

They think it’s intrusive. Somewhere along the way, “why are you selling” got filed alongside asking someone’s income or their marriage — too personal to raise, especially early in a client relationship. So the conversation stays at the surface: bedrooms, price, showings.

They don’t know what to do with the answer. Asking is only useful if you know how to respond to what you hear. An agent who’s never been trained to structure a deal around a seller’s actual constraint has no reason to go looking for it. If your only tool is “list it and wait for a cash offer,” knowing more about the seller’s situation doesn’t change what you’d do next — so there’s no real incentive to ask.

There’s no relationship that’s earned the conversation. This connects straight back to the open-listing problem covered earlier in this series. When six agents share one listing with no exclusive agreement, none of them has invested enough to earn a sensitive conversation. Sellers open up to someone who’s clearly representing them, not one of several people fishing for a commission.

What it costs when nobody asks

A seller whose real motivation is speed, but who’s being marketed purely on price because nobody asked, sits on the market the same way every overpriced listing sits — for years, adding to the stale inventory covered earlier in this series. A seller in genuine financial pressure who needed a fast, understanding buyer instead gets strung along by an open listing with no real advocate. None of that is inevitable. It’s just what happens when the one question that would change the deal never gets asked.

The rest of this cluster looks at what actually surfaces when someone bothers to ask —

starting with financial pressure, one of the most common and least discussed reasons people sell here.

Chapter 8: Selling Under Financial Pressure? Here’s What Actually Matters to a Buyer

Financial distress is one of the most common reasons a property comes to market here, and one of the least discussed openly. Carrying costs that have quietly become unsustainable. Debt that needs clearing. An owner who bought at the top of their budget years ago and has been slowly falling behind on holding expenses ever since, watching the gap between what they owe and what the market will realistically pay slowly close in.

Why the asking price is often the wrong focus

A seller in this position will often list at a number aimed at solving their financial problem outright — clearing a debt, recovering a specific figure — rather than a number grounded in what the property will actually fetch. That’s an understandable instinct. It’s also usually the reason the listing goes nowhere, because a price built around a personal need rather than market reality doesn’t attract offers, and a stalled listing only deepens the financial pressure it was meant to relieve.

What these sellers usually need more than a high offer

Speed and certainty. A seller managing real financial pressure is often better served by a clean, fast, guaranteed close at a fair number than by a slightly higher offer that drags on for months of inspections, financing contingencies, and renegotiation. Every extra month on market is another month of the carrying costs that created the pressure in the first place.

This is where a buyer who understands the situation can genuinely help rather than simply extract value from it. A fast, clean, all-cash close — with realistic terms and no drawn-out contingencies — can be worth more to a seller in this position than a marginally higher number that isn’t actually reliable.

Why this rarely gets identified

As the previous post in this series covered, almost nobody asks a seller directly what’s driving their timeline or whether financial pressure is part of the picture. So these sellers get marketed exactly like every other seller — list at a number, wait, hope — even though their actual priorities (speed, certainty, minimal complications) are often completely different from a seller who’s in no hurry at all.

A note on handling this well

There’s an obvious risk of a buyer treating a seller’s distress as leverage to extract an unfairly low price. That’s not what’s being described here. Identifying financial pressure isn’t about exploiting it — it’s about structuring an offer that actually solves the problem the seller has, on terms that are fair to both sides. A seller who needs speed and certainty more than they need the absolute top number can get exactly that from the right offer, structured around what they actually need rather than a generic asking-price negotiation.

Chapter 9: Selling an Inherited Property in Grenada: Why Estates Stall

Some of the longest-sitting listings in Grenada aren't overpriced or poorly marketed in any obvious way. They're estates — properties left behind after a death, where multiple heirs, often scattered across different countries, have to agree on price, timeline, and whether to sell at all before anything can move forward.

Why these deals stall even when everyone wants to sell

It's rarely that the property is unwanted. It's that the people who own it haven't fully agreed among themselves. One heir wants to sell quickly and move on. Another feels attached to the property and isn't emotionally ready, even if they've said yes on paper. A third lives overseas, is hard to reach, and hasn't engaged with the process at all. Any offer that comes in has to somehow satisfy all of them, and a standard offer built for a single motivated seller rarely does.

Add distance and time zones, and even simple administrative steps — signing documents, agreeing on a listing price, responding to an offer — can take months longer than they would for a single local owner.

Why a generic listing approach fails here

An estate sale marketed the same way as an ordinary sale — a price on a website, wait for offers — misses the actual obstacle entirely. The obstacle usually isn't finding a buyer. It's getting the sellers to agree with each other. No amount of marketing solves that, and no standard cash offer addresses it either, because a standard offer doesn't account for the fact that acceptance requires multiple, sometimes conflicting, yeses.

What actually helps an estate sale move

A buyer who understands the dynamic can structure an offer that makes agreement easier rather than harder — clear, simple terms that don't require complicated coordination; a timeline realistic enough to accommodate heirs who aren't local; sometimes a willingness to work directly with an estate attorney to make sure the process satisfies every legal requirement without adding friction for the family. None of this is exotic. It's simply paying attention to the actual obstacle instead of assuming the obstacle is price.

Why this connects back to the rest of this series

As earlier posts in this cluster have covered, almost nobody asks a seller what's actually happening behind a listing. An estate is one of the clearest examples of why that matters — because the surface information (a price, a description) gives no indication at all that there are multiple decision-makers involved, each with their own timeline and their own relationship to the property. A buyer who never finds that out is negotiating with the wrong picture of the deal in front of them.

Chapter 10: Divorce, Relocation, or Just Done: Reading What a Seller Actually Needs

Not every seller's real motivation is dramatic, and not every one requires the same kind of sensitivity. This post rounds out the seller-motivation cluster of this series by covering a few more of the common reasons people sell property in Grenada, each of which calls for a different approach from a buyer paying attention.

Divorce and separation

These sales are often urgent, and often complicated by two parties who no longer communicate well, sometimes with lawyers already involved on both sides. What tends to matter most here isn't squeezing out the highest possible number — it's speed and simple, clean terms. Every extra month the sale drags on is another month two people who want to be finished with each other remain tied together by a shared asset. An offer that closes cleanly and quickly is often worth more to both parties than one that's marginally higher but slower or more complicated.

Life change and relocation

A job elsewhere. Health needs that pull someone closer to family. A simple decision that Grenada was a chapter rather than a destination. These sellers are often the most straightforward to work with once identified, because their goal is genuinely clear: they want to be done, cleanly, on a reasonable timeline.

The problem is that if nobody ever asks why they're selling, that clarity never surfaces. Their listing gets marketed and negotiated exactly the same way as an owner who's in absolutely no hurry — which means offers that would actually suit them (fast, simple, certain) never get made, because nobody knew to make them.

Health and mobility

Owners who can no longer manage stairs, upkeep, or the general logistics of a property that made sense a decade ago and doesn't now. As with relocation, timeline and simplicity usually matter more here than squeezing the last dollar out of the price — the priority is getting out of a situation that's become genuinely difficult to manage, not maximizing a negotiation.

Simply done

No drama, no distress. Someone who bought for a particular season of life and is ready for the next one. Even this most straightforward case benefits from being identified directly, because "ready to be done" negotiates differently than "testing the market to see what happens" — a seller in the first category will often take a fair, prompt offer that a seller in the second wouldn't.

The thread that runs through this whole cluster

None of the reasons covered across this cluster — financial pressure, estates, divorce, relocation, health, or simply being ready — are secrets sellers are desperate to hide. They're just never asked, so they never surface, and the deal proceeds as if every seller in Grenada wants exactly the same thing: the highest number, on no particular timeline, from anyone at all. Most sellers don't want that. Most want their actual situation resolved, and the highest number is only sometimes the way to resolve it.

The next cluster in this series turns to a specific corner of the market where this same blind spot shows up in a different form — Grenada’s CBI-linked developments, where owners trying to exit face a version of the same problem, with its own particular complications.

Chapter 11: The CBI Exit Problem: Why Owners Can’t Get What They Paid

Grenada’s Citizenship by Investment programme has built a lot of real estate — resorts, branded condo-hotels, fractional shares in developments that photograph beautifully. It’s brought real money and real construction into a small economy, and the case for the programme itself is genuine.

But there’s a second act nobody markets, and it’s one I run into regularly as a buyer and investor here: CBI unit owners who want out.

The owner who has what they came for

The pattern is consistent. Someone bought into an approved development years ago. They qualified, they received their citizenship, the documents are filed away. The investment did exactly what it was meant to do.

What’s left is a condo unit in the Caribbean they may have never lived in, that costs money every year to simply hold: strata or HOA fees, property tax, hurricane-zone insurance, management fees, their share of reserve contributions when something needs replacing, currency conversion and wire fees, an attorney on retainer to handle what they can’t handle from thousands of miles away.

They’re not distressed. They just want to stop paying for something they don’t use — which, as the previous cluster in this series covered, is exactly the kind of real motivation that almost never gets asked about directly, so the conversation jumps straight to price instead.

The ask that can’t work

And the ask, almost without exception, is: they want what they paid. Sometimes more. What they almost never want is to discount for the passport.

Here’s why that doesn’t clear. The original price was bundled. Part of it was real estate. Part of it was a citizenship carrying visa-free travel, tax planning options, a second option in an uncertain world, and the scarcity of a legal route to get one. The unit was the delivery mechanism. The passport was the product.

A second buyer — an ordinary investor or end user — is buying only the condo. The citizenship component isn’t transferring. So the seller is effectively asking for the bundled price while delivering one piece of the bundle. Stated plainly, that’s not going to clear. But it’s the opening position in nearly every one of these conversations, because the seller’s only reference point is their own purchase price, and nobody has ever shown them a number that contradicts it.

The narrow alternative

There is a path to reselling within the CBI framework itself — to another applicant who wants that specific project’s citizenship benefit. But the unit typically has to remain within the approved-project structure, the seller needs to have cleared the mandatory holding period, and the buyer pool is small, rule-bound, and competed for by the developer’s own ongoing sales effort. An individual reseller is competing against the developer’s marketing budget and sales network, with a used unit and no sales infrastructure of their own. It’s a hard trade, and the rules around holding periods and eligibility are set by policy and do change — anyone actually in this position should confirm current terms with an attorney rather than rely on a general description.

Strip out the CBI buyer entirely, and the unit has to stand on its own against everything else on the market. Which is exactly the question the next post in this cluster takes on directly: what is one of these units actually worth without the programme attached to it?

Chapter 12: What a CBI Condo Is Actually Worth Without the Passport

The previous post in this series laid out why a CBI unit owner asking for their original purchase price usually can't get it once the citizenship benefit is off the table. This one covers how to actually arrive at a real number instead.

Why the obvious approach doesn't work

In an ordinary market, you'd answer this with comparable sales — what similar units nearby actually sold for. As earlier posts in this series covered, Grenada doesn't have an MLS, doesn't have published sold-price data, and has no shared reference for price per square foot anywhere in the market, CBI developments included.

So the vacuum gets filled with the only public numbers available: other CBI asking prices. That's circular. A CBI-priced unit ends up being valued against other CBI-priced units, which were themselves set against a programme minimum rather than against any real demand for a Caribbean condo. None of those numbers were ever tested against an actual buyer who wasn't also chasing a passport.

Building a real number from the ground up

Income. What does the unit actually net, after management fees, taxes, insurance, vacancy, and the off-season? Capitalise that at a rate that genuinely reflects the risk of a single-unit Caribbean holding — hurricane exposure, thin resale liquidity, currency and jurisdiction risk, and total dependence on a single management company's performance. That rate is not going to be a generous one.

Replacement. What would it cost to build the equivalent today, and what does comparable non-CBI inventory on the island currently ask?

Exit. How long would it realistically take to sell this specific unit, and what does that holding period cost in fees, insurance, and lost use of capital? In a market where ordinary properties can sit for years, as earlier posts in this series covered, a specialised resort unit with a narrower buyer pool is not the quick sale.

Done honestly, this exercise frequently lands well below the original purchase price. Not because anyone was defrauded — the original buyer got exactly what they paid for, which was citizenship — but because the real estate itself was never the whole of what that price represented.

Why this number matters to both sides of a resale

For an owner trying to exit, this is the number that determines whether a listing is realistic or just another entry in Grenada's pile of stale, years-old inventory. For a buyer, it's the number that actually protects against overpaying for a story rather than an asset. Both sides are better served by starting from something real than from a purchase price that was never about the property alone.

One major input into that income calculation — how CBI rental pools actually distribute revenue back to owners — deserves its own close look, because it's often the single biggest gap between what a unit looks like it should earn and what it actually does.

Chapter 13: Inside the Rental Pool: Where CBI Owner Profits Actually Go

Almost every CBI-linked development comes with a management agreement and some form of pooled rental arrangement. The pitch is simple: you don’t have to do anything, the operator markets and runs the property, revenue goes into a pool, owners take a share. The previous post in this series flagged this as a major input into what a unit is actually worth. Here’s a closer look at why owner distributions so often disappoint.

The fees stack up faster than expected

A management fee on gross revenue is just the starting point. On top of that: a marketing contribution, booking channel commissions (which on OTAs can be substantial), housekeeping, linen, utilities, landscaping, pool and grounds maintenance, front desk staffing, and a reserve or FF&E contribution set aside for periodic refurbishment. Each item is individually defensible. Stacked together, they can consume most of what came in the door. The operator’s own revenue is largely tied to gross bookings; the owner’s is whatever survives after every one of those costs is deducted first. Those two incentives are not naturally aligned.

Refurbishment cycles hit distributions hard

Branded properties are contractually required to keep rooms at a certain standard. Every few years there’s a scheduled refresh — furniture, fixtures, soft goods — and owners are assessed for their share of it, often at a level that wipes out several years of prior distributions in a single hit.

The pool formula is where the real value sits

This is the part almost nobody reads closely before buying in. Is revenue split by actual unit-nights sold, or by ownership share regardless of whether that specific unit was occupied at all? Who decides which units get booked first — is the operator’s own inventory, or a favoured owner’s unit, at the front of the queue? Are an owner’s personal-use nights deducted from their share of the pool, and at what notional rate? A formula that reads as fair in a glossy brochure can turn out to be quietly unfavourable once you actually work through the schedule attached to the contract.

Reporting is often too thin to check any of it

Owners frequently receive only a net figure — no visibility into gross bookings, occupancy by individual unit, channel mix, or a line-item cost breakdown. Without those inputs, there’s no way to tell whether a disappointing distribution reflects a genuinely weak season or a management structure that’s simply taking too large a share. And most agreements give owners no audit right and no practical mechanism to replace the operator if they’re unhappy.

What this does to the property’s real value

The result, often enough, is that the operator does fine, the property itself runs at respectable occupancy, and the owner’s annual statement shows something close to zero, or negative, once assessments are factored in. The building is a functioning business. It just isn’t the owner’s business.

This matters directly to resale. An investor buyer values a unit off its actual net income, as the previous post in this series covered. If net income is near zero, an honest valuation lands near zero too — and the only thing propping the asking price up is the story attached to it, not the numbers behind it.

The final post in this series turns this into a practical checklist for anyone actually considering a CBI resale purchase.

Chapter 14: Buying a CBI Resale: A Buyer’s Checklist

This series has covered a lot of ground — no licensing, no MLS, open listings with no accountability, stale inventory, heavy transaction costs, cash-only deals, sellers nobody bothers to understand, and CBI units that can’t fetch what their owners paid. This final post turns the CBI portion into something practical: what to actually check before buying one of these units on the secondary market.

Why the secondary market favours you

If you’re buying here, you have a structural advantage worth recognizing. You’re buying from a motivated seller in the thinnest resale segment of an already illiquid market, and there are only a handful of buyers positioned to do what you’re doing. That advantage is only real if you underwrite the deal properly instead of anchoring to the developer’s price list.

The checklist

Get real income history, not projections. Three years of actual distributions and actual assessments, not marketing materials or forecasted occupancy. The gap between what was projected and what was actually paid out is often the most honest number in the whole file.

Read the resale clause in the management agreement. Does it bind your purchase? Is there a right of first refusal held by the developer or operator? Some agreements make it difficult to sell without the operator’s involvement or consent — know this before you’re mid-negotiation, not after.

Confirm CBI resale eligibility and holding periods with an attorney. These are set by policy and they change. Don’t rely on what the seller tells you, and don’t rely on a general description like this one — get current terms directly.

Underwrite off net income and replacement cost, not the asking price. As earlier posts in this series covered, ignore the developer’s current price list entirely for valuation purposes. Build your own number from documented income, realistic capitalisation, and what it would cost to build or buy the equivalent today.

Read every clause about fees, assessments, and refurbishment schedules. These are the line items that quietly determine whether the unit throws off real income or just breaks even. Know what’s coming before you own it.

Understand your ability to exit or self-manage. If the agreement locks you into an operator you can’t audit and can’t replace, that’s not a minor detail — it is, functionally, the investment itself.

If you’re the one holding a CBI unit

Start from what a non-CBI buyer would actually pay, not from what you originally paid. Pull your own three years of distributions and assessments before listing. Read your own management agreement’s resale clause before a buyer does. And weigh honestly whether a better price later is worth several more years of holding costs, in a market where “later” has historically meant years, as earlier posts in this series covered. Time is a cost, and in an illiquid market, it’s usually the largest one.

Where this series leaves things

> Fourteen posts in, the shape of the problem has stayed consistent across every corner of this market — an ordinary family home, an estate with multiple heirs, or a branded CBI condo. No licensing. No shared data. No one asking sellers what they actually need. Every gap compounds the next one, and every seller and buyer pays for it in the same currency: time and money that didn’t have to be lost.

None of it is unfixable. Licensing, a shared listing database, normalised exclusive agreements, honest conversations with sellers about what they actually need, and clear-eyed valuation of CBI units instead of borrowed price lists — none of that requires new technology or a different economy. It requires people in this market deciding to do it differently. That’s the case this whole series has tried to make, one piece at a time.

Chapter 15: Who’s Actually Appraising Your Property?

Every earlier chapter in this book traces back to the same root problem: no licensing, no shared data, no independent check on the numbers anyone puts in front of a buyer or seller. It turns out the same gap runs straight through the one profession you’d expect to be the exception — the appraiser.

Banks require an appraisal before they’ll lend against a property, and the CBI programme requires one before it will accept a real estate investment. Both of those facts suggest a formal, credentialed process standing behind the number. Looking closely at how it actually works here, that impression doesn’t hold up.

There is no licensing body for appraisers in Grenada

The same way anyone can call themselves a real estate agent here, as the first chapter of this book covered, there is no dedicated regulatory board or licensing regime for property appraisers or valuers either, and no legislation establishing one. Some neighbouring islands have taken a different path — St. Lucia, for instance, has the Institute of Surveyors (ISSLU), a recognised body regulating standards across valuation, quantity, building, land, and project management surveying. Grenada has no equivalent. There’s no exam to pass, no register to appear on, and no body to complain to if an appraisal turns out to be wrong or biased.

“Appraiser” isn’t really one profession here

Look at who actually performs valuations in Grenada and the picture gets more interesting. Grenada Development Bank publishes its own approved appraiser list for mortgage lending, and it’s revealing: the roster mixes dedicated valuators with architects, civil and structural engineers, quantity surveyors, and general construction and project management firms. There’s no single professional lane that “appraiser” runs through. An engineer, an architect, and a quantity surveyor can all end up producing the valuation report a bank relies on to approve a loan, alongside people whose actual title is valuator.

That’s not necessarily a problem on its own — an experienced engineer or quantity surveyor may well understand construction costs and property condition better than a generalist. But it does mean the “appraiser” on any given file could be coming at the number from a completely different training background than the one on the file next to it, with no common standard tying their methods together.

Banks fill the gap by keeping their own lists

Since there’s no government body vetting appraisers, individual lenders do it themselves. A bank maintains its own approved list and simply won’t accept a valuation from anyone not on it. That solves the bank’s own risk problem, but it means the bar for “acceptable appraiser” varies from one lender to the next, based on whatever relationships and track record each institution happens to have built, rather than on any external, uniform qualification a buyer or seller could check independently.

Some professionals hold themselves to an outside standard — voluntarily

Not everyone in this space is working without a compass. Some regional and Grenada-based firms follow the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Red Book standards and hold RICS credentials, even though nothing compels them to. Firms with Chartered Valuation Surveyors on staff, adhering to an internationally recognised valuation framework, are the closest thing to a real professional standard operating in this market. But it’s entirely opt-in. Nothing stops any appraiser here from skipping it.

What this means for a CBI valuation specifically

The CBI programme’s own language requires that a qualifying property be valued by an independent, government-approved appraiser, to guard against over- or under-valuation. That phrase shows up nearly word-for-word across a wide range of CBI advisory websites, which suggests they’re all repeating the same official wording rather than describing a roster they’ve actually seen. I wasn’t able to locate a published, named list of which appraisers currently hold that government-approved status for CBI purposes. It’s possible one exists but isn’t publicly indexed, or that approval happens on a per-project or per-transaction basis rather than through a standing public register. Either way, it isn’t something a prospective buyer can currently look up and verify on their own — they’re relying on whoever the developer or their agent tells them is approved.

Why this matters even when the appraiser is honest

None of this means Grenada’s appraisers are doing bad work. Many are careful, experienced professionals. The issue is structural, not personal, and it’s the same issue running through every other chapter of this book: even a completely honest, competent appraiser here is working from the same thin well of comparable sales data as everyone else. Grenada’s lack of a shared listing database and published sold-price records — covered in Chapter 2 — doesn’t just make it hard for agents to price a listing. It makes it hard for anyone, however qualified, to produce a truly defensible market comparison, because the underlying sales data an appraisal should be checked against is often incomplete or simply unavailable.

A valuer’s method might be exactly right — market comparison, cost approach, income approach, all the standard, recognisable tools of the trade. But a valuation is only as strong as the data feeding it, and in a market with no MLS and no reliable transaction history, even the best method is working with a thinner foundation than it would have almost anywhere else.

The practical takeaway

If you’re buying, selling, or refinancing here, it’s worth asking a direct question before you rely on any single appraisal: what data did this valuation actually draw on, and does the appraiser hold any outside credential — RICS or otherwise — that puts their work in front of an external standard? Neither question is intrusive, and neither should be hard for a credible professional to answer. In a market where licensing, data, and accountability are all in short supply, a little direct diligence on the appraisal itself is one of the few checks currently available.

Chapter 16: The Illusion of Oversight: The GRA, Disclosures, and Inspections

Every chapter so far has been about something that's genuinely missing from this market. This one is a little different. It's about something that exists, but doesn't do what an outsider would naturally assume it does — plus two more gaps that follow the same pattern: a widely assumed safeguard that turns out, on close inspection, not to be there at all.

The Grenada Realtors Association isn't a licensing body

There is an actual organisation here called the Grenada Realtors Association, and to anyone coming from the United States or the United Kingdom, the name alone suggests something it isn't. In the U.S., the term REALTOR is tied to National Association of Realtors membership and a defined code of ethics; in the UK, professional credibility in property runs largely through bodies like RICS. Both carry real institutional weight and, in the case of U.S. state licensing, legal force behind them. Hearing "Grenada Realtors Association" naturally invites the same assumption: a governing body that licenses agents and holds them to enforceable standards.

That's not what the GRA is. It's a voluntary trade association. Founded in 2005, it went through a multi-year period of dormancy before reorganising in 2021 under new leadership, which is itself a telling detail — a body meant to uphold industry standards simply stopped functioning for four years, and the market carried on regardless, because nothing about an agent's ability to operate depended on the association being active. Since reorganising, the GRA has written its own code of ethics for members who choose to join. But membership is voluntary, and plenty of active agents in this market simply aren't members at all. Nothing requires it.

Here's the detail that confirms everything this book has already argued: one of the reorganised GRA's own stated top priorities has been pushing to get the real estate market legislated — meeting with the Attorney General's Chambers and making formal submissions toward that goal. An organisation actively lobbying the government to create licensing legislation is, by definition, telling you that licensing legislation doesn't exist yet. The GRA isn't the regulator outsiders assume it is. It's a group of agents advocating for a regulator to eventually exist.

None of this is a criticism of the GRA itself — quite the opposite. An industry association pushing for its own regulation is doing something genuinely constructive, and it's consistent with the fix this book has pointed to since Chapter 1. The issue is purely one of appearances: a name like "Realtors Association" reads, to anyone unfamiliar with how thin the infrastructure here actually is, as proof that oversight exists. It doesn't. If you're working with an agent, their GRA membership (or lack of it) tells you about their own professional inclination, not about any enforceable standard they're bound to.

Disclosure forms: assumed, but not required

Buyers coming from markets with mandatory seller disclosure — a standard government or association form that walks through the condition of the roof, the foundation, the electrical and plumbing systems, known defects, and so on — often assume something similar exists everywhere. It doesn't here.

Looking at what a Grenada seller is actually, legally required to disclose, it comes down to matters of title: proving ownership, showing a clear chain of title, and disclosing any mortgages, liens, or other encumbrances on the property. There is no equivalent legal requirement to disclose the physical condition of the property itself — no standard form, no checklist, nothing binding a seller to describe a leaking roof, a failing septic system, or unpermitted work.

Some individual agencies may use their own informal disclosure documents, borrowed or adapted from templates written for other markets. That’s worth noticing rather than trusting at face value: a form styled on U.S. practice, referencing U.S.-specific legal concepts that don’t even apply here, isn’t evidence of a real local disclosure standard — it’s evidence that the underlying content was copied rather than built for this market. A buyer handed a disclosure form here should treat it as a courtesy the seller or agent chose to offer, not as a legal guarantee of completeness.

Inspections: legal, common-sense, and entirely optional

Property inspections are not a required step in a Grenada transaction. They’re allowed, they’re sensible, and many buyers — particularly those unfamiliar with the property or the market — do hire someone to look the place over before closing. But nothing compels it, and nothing compels a seller to permit or cooperate with one beyond what’s negotiated directly between the parties.

As earlier chapters covered, there’s no distinct, credentialed “home inspector” profession clearly operating in this market the way there is in the U.S. or Canada. The same overlapping pool of engineers, architects, and quantity surveyors who show up doing valuation work are the most likely candidates a buyer would actually hire to look at a property before purchase. That’s not necessarily a problem — a structural engineer may be more qualified to assess a foundation than a generalist inspector trained to check a standard checklist. But it does mean a buyer has to go find and vet that person themselves, with no directory, no standard certification, and no assurance that “inspector” means the same thing from one hire to the next.

The common thread

Three different things — an association name, a disclosure form, an inspection — and all three follow exactly the same pattern. Each one looks, from the outside, like the safeguard a buyer or seller would expect to find in a more established market. Each one turns out, on closer look, to be either voluntary, informal, or simply absent as a requirement. None of this means buyers and sellers are unprotected — good agents, good lawyers, and careful buyers who insist on their own inspection can still get a clean, well-informed deal done. But nobody should assume the market is doing that protecting for them by default. In Grenada, due diligence isn’t a background service the system provides. It’s something each party has to actively go build for themselves, every time.

Chapter 17: Percentage Fees and No Title Insurance: What Happens If the Title Is Wrong

Buying or selling here, you'll run into a legal fee structure that surprises a lot of people: lawyers commonly charge one to three percent of the sale price for conveyancing, rather than a flat fee tied to the work actually involved. And underneath that fee sits something even more surprising: there's no title insurance in this market at all. Put those two facts together and a reasonable question follows — what actually happens if the title turns out to be wrong?

Percentage fees aren't invented here, but the rate is out of line

This billing structure isn't unique to Grenada. In the UK, conveyancing solicitors do sometimes charge a percentage of the sale price rather than a flat fee — it's one of two standard models solicitors there use, alongside fixed fees. Grenada's legal system descends directly from English common law, so the percentage-billing convention most likely arrived here the same way much of Grenada's conveyancing practice did: inherited from British legal tradition rather than invented locally.

But the actual rate is where this market stands apart. UK percentage-based conveyancing typically runs a small fraction of one percent — figures around a quarter of one percent show up repeatedly in UK fee guides, and most UK solicitors actually prefer flat fees in the range of a few hundred to a couple of thousand pounds regardless of price. Grenada's one to three percent is a different order of magnitude. On a $500,000 property, that's the difference between roughly $1,250 in the UK and $5,000 to $15,000 here. The mechanism is borrowed. The rate has drifted somewhere closer to what an agent's commission looks like, not what a lawyer's conveyancing fee looks like anywhere else this model is used.

Why title is a live question here in a way it isn't everywhere

Grenada uses a deed-based title system, not a government-guaranteed registered title system. Ownership is evidenced by deeds recorded at the Deeds and Land Registry, but that record is exactly that — a record, not a guarantee. A Grenada High Court judge put this bluntly in a 2019 ruling, describing the deed-paper title system as fundamentally unreliable and stating outright that registration does not guarantee title — it's evidence of a claim, not conclusive proof of ownership. There has been a long-running push to replace this with a proper Land Registration System that would give buyers an actual government-backed guarantee, but as of recent reporting, that reform still hasn't been fully implemented across the board.

It gets more pointed than that. Grenada's own official land registry platform carries an explicit legal disclaimer stating it makes no warranties of any kind and won't be liable for losses arising from its use. The government's own registry is telling you, in writing, not to treat it as a guarantee.

No title insurance exists to fill the gap

In markets like the U.S. and Canada, title insurance exists precisely to cover this risk — it protects a buyer against financial loss from a defect in title that a search failed to catch, no matter whose fault it was. Grenada has no such product available. There's no evidence of title insurers operating in this market, and given how the underlying title system itself works, it isn't hard to see why: insuring against defects in a system that the courts themselves have called unreliable is a difficult product to price and sell.

So what actually happens if title turns out to be wrong?

Based on what's publicly available, there's no clean, guaranteed answer — and that absence of an answer is itself the honest picture. Without title insurance and without a guaranteed registration system, the practical protection a buyer has comes down almost entirely to how thorough their lawyer's title search was before closing. That's part of why the historical search period here has been so long: Grenada law used to require lawyers to trace a chain of title back sixty years before certifying it as good, though Parliament has since amended the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act to cut that down to thirty years. A deeper search reduces risk. It doesn't eliminate it — it just makes an undiscovered defect less likely, not impossible.

If a defect surfaces after closing that the search missed, a buyer's recourse depends entirely on why it was missed. That distinction is significant enough to deserve its own close look, which is where the next chapter picks up.

Chapter 18: Are Lawyers Insured? Mandatory Coverage and Its Real Limits

The previous chapter ended on an open question: if title turns out to be wrong after closing, what recourse does a buyer actually have? The answer turns out to be more encouraging than most of this book's findings — with one important limit that still leaves a real gap.

Professional indemnity insurance is mandatory for attorneys here

Unlike agents, appraisers, and inspectors — all covered in earlier chapters as unregulated or voluntarily regulated at best — attorneys in Grenada are a genuinely licensed, statutorily governed profession. Under the Legal Profession Act, an attorney-at-law cannot practise law in Grenada, or represent that they're entitled to, unless they're covered by professional indemnity insurance covering their legal practice here. This isn't a norm or a recommendation. It's a statutory condition of holding a practising certificate.

The General Legal Council, which issues and renews those certificates, is explicitly responsible for making sure attorneys maintain that insurance, and for ensuring they pursue continuing education annually — a real, functioning requirement that stands in direct contrast to the complete absence of continuing education requirements covered in earlier chapters on agents and appraisers. The Council also serves as the formal venue where clients lodge complaints against attorneys, which means there's an actual accountability channel here that simply doesn't exist anywhere else in a Grenada real estate transaction.

One caveat worth knowing: the Act also allows the Council to make rules exempting an attorney, or a class of attorneys, from the insurance requirement. It isn't clear from public information how often that exemption is actually used in practice. It's worth directly asking any lawyer you engage whether they currently carry professional indemnity insurance and at what coverage limit, since the law permits exceptions even though the default rule is mandatory.

Why this is real recourse, but not the same recourse title insurance would give

This is the distinction that actually matters. Professional indemnity insurance covers negligence. It pays out if your lawyer did something wrong — missed something in the title search that a competent search should have caught, made an error in the paperwork, failed to properly verify an encumbrance that was findable. If a defect surfaces later and it traces back to the lawyer's own carelessness, there's a real claim against a real, mandatorily insured party, and a real complaints body to escalate to if needed.

Title insurance, by contrast, is no-fault. It protects a buyer even when nobody was negligent — a forged deed somewhere back in the chain, an heir nobody knew existed, an error inside the registry's own records, a boundary dispute that no reasonable search would ever have surfaced. A lawyer's professional indemnity insurance doesn't reach any of that, because there's no negligence to point to. Nobody did anything wrong. The underlying title itself was simply bad, and as the previous chapter covered, Grenada's deed-based system doesn't guarantee against that possibility in the first place.

The honest summary

Buyers here have real, legally mandated recourse if their lawyer’s search was careless. They have no recourse at all if the title itself is bad through nobody’s fault — which is precisely the scenario title insurance exists to cover in markets that have it, and precisely the scenario Grenada’s system leaves fully exposed. A one-to-three-percent legal fee is buying a genuinely accountable professional, backed by mandatory insurance and a real complaints body. It is not buying a guarantee that the property you’re closing on actually has clean title. Those are two different things, and it’s worth knowing exactly which one you’re paying for.

Closing Thoughts

Fifteen chapters in, one thread runs through all of it: nearly everything this book has covered comes back to the same missing piece. No licensing for agents. No licensing for appraisers. No shared listing database. No published sold-price data. No requirement to ask a seller what they actually need before an offer gets built. Every gap sits on top of the last one, and every buyer, seller, and owner in this market pays for it in the same currency — time, money, and deals that should have closed cleanly but didn't.

None of it is unique to any one bad actor. An unlicensed agent, an appraiser with no external standard to answer to, a seller pricing off pure guesswork — none of them set out to make this market harder than it needs to be. They're working inside a structure that was never built to make it easy, and most people here have simply adapted around the gap rather than closing it.

That's the case this book has tried to make, one piece at a time: an ordinary family home, an estate with siblings who don't agree, a CBI condo whose owner just wants out, a bank appraisal built on thinner data than anyone would like. Different situations, same missing infrastructure underneath each one.

The fixes aren't exotic. Licensing regimes exist all over this region as working templates. A shared listing platform is a database and an agreement to populate it honestly, not a technological mystery. Asking a seller a direct, respectful question about what they actually need costs nothing at all. None of it requires reinventing anything — it requires people in this market deciding to do it differently.

Until that happens, the honest approach is the one this book has tried to model throughout: understand the structure for what it actually is, build offers and decisions around real numbers rather than borrowed ones, and ask the questions nobody else is asking. That won't fix the market on its own. But it's the difference between negotiating in the dark and knowing exactly what you're standing on.